Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Masters Theses

Student Theses & Publications

2018

Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security
Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun
Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in Technology at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more
about the program.

Recommended Citation
Fatokun, Anuoluwapo Ope, "Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security" (2018). Masters Theses. 3560.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/3560

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

The Graduate School

�

EJsrol.'I lw:-.ns lNl\'ERSITY"

Thesis Maintenance and Reproduction Certificate
Graduate Candid ates Completing Theses in Par tial Fulfillment of the Degree

FOR:

Graduate Faculty Advisors Directing the Theses
Preservation, Reproduction, and Distribution of Thesis Research

RE:

Preserving, reproducing, and distributing thesis research is an important part of Booth Library's responsibility to
provide access to scholarship. In order to further this goal, Booth Library makes all graduate theses completed as
part of a degree program at Eastern Illinois University available for personal study, research, and other not-for
profit educational purposes. Under 17 U.S.C.

§ 108, the library may reproduce and distribute a copy without

infringing on copyright; however, professional courtesy dictates that permission be requested from the author
before doing so.
Your signatures affirm the following:
•The graduate candidate is the author of this thesis.
• The graduate candidate retains the copyright and intellectual property rights associated with the original
research, creative activity, and intellectual or artistic content of the thesis.
• The graduate candidate certifies her/his compliance with federal copyright law (Title 17 of the U.S. Code) and
her/his right to authorize reproduction and distribution of all copyrighted materials included in this thesis.
•The graduate candidate in consultation with the faculty advisor grants Booth Library the nonexclusive, perpetual
right to make copies of the thesis freely and publicly available without restriction, by means of any current or
successive technology, including but not limited to photocopying, microfilm, digitization, or internet.
•The graduate candidate acknowledges that by depositing her/his thesis with Booth Library, her/his work is
available for viewing by the public and may be borrowed through the library's circulation and interlibrary loan
departments, or accessed electronically. The graduate candidate acknowledges this policy by indicating in the
following manner:

v/" Yes, I wish to make accessible this thesis for viewing by the public

No, I wish to quarantine the thesis temporarily and have included the Thesis Withholding Request Form

___

• The graduate candidate waives the confidentiality provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) (20 U.S. C.

§ 1232g; 34 CFR

Part 99) with respect to the contents of the thesis and with respect to

information concerning authorship of the thesis, including name and status as a student at Eastern Illinois

University. I have conferred with my graduate faculty advisor. My signature below indicates that I have read and

agree with the above statements, and hereby give my permission to allow Booth Library to reproduce and
;ignature indicates concurrence 1

Graduate Cand idate Signature

blA�"'� ofUZ= �
--r;.

�
;;�

Printed Name

M-Sc-

Graduate Degr

P

Please submit in duplicate.

Faculty Adviser Signature

l:xt\l cJ VJ �l-IDY\

� � 20\8
Printed Name

e

DEFENSE IN DEPTH
NETWORK PERIMETER
SECURITY

BY

Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun

THESIS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Science in Technology

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

2018
YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

5
DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

$/l/19>

/9/1!

DATE

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

ii

Copyright© 2018 by Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun
All Rights Reserved

iii

ABSTRACT
Defense in depth network perimeter security has always be a topic of discussion for
a long time as an efficient way of mitigating cyber-attacks. While there are no 100%
mitigating method against cyber-attacks, a layered defense in depth network perimeter
security can be used to mitigate against cyber-attacks. Research have shown a massive
growth in cyber-crimes and there are limited number of cyber security expert to counter
this attacks. EIU as an institution is taking up the responsibility of producing cyber security
graduates with the new Master of Science in Cyber Security program that started in Fall

2017.
This research is aim at designing and developing a defense in depth network
perimeter security that will be used for laboratory practices to learn and simulate cyber
security activity and its mitigation. The research is complemented with the design of ten
laboratory practices to give expertise to the students in the equipment used in the design.
The designed topology comprises of two sites, connected via IPSec site to site VPN over
an unsecure internet connection. A public testing webserver is placed at the DMZ which is
to be used to invite hackers to attack the design system for the purpose of detecting,
preventing and learning cyber-attack mechanisms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the light of all the headline-grabbing network and cyber security breaches in the last

few years ranging from Equifax hacking to the alleged USA presidential election hacking and
the recently announced Yahoo hacking among others. It's understandable that enterprises
might be on high alert to prevent their own organization from being thrust into the spotlight,
unfortunately there are no best solution to this because today's cyber criminals are just too
persistent [l]. A multiple layered defense in depth strategy for network perimeter security can
provide

an

answer to mitigate cyber security attacks. Putting a number on the cost of

cybercrime and cyber espionage is the headline, but the dollar figure may not take in account
the damage to the victims due to the cumulative effect of losses in cyberspace [2].
We operate in a real world of system misconfigurations, software bugs, disgruntled
employees, and overloaded system administrators [3]. The increasing sophisticated nature of
cyber-attacks on computer networks these days has rendered most of the traditional firewalls
inefficient; even the most complex ones are insufficient for protecting attacks from general
computer networks [4]. The defense in depth's strategy of network perimeter security helps in
protecting network resources even if one of the security layer is compromised [3).
In the past, IT executives have concentrated their efforts in perimeter hardening by
carefully firewalling all points of entry on their network connected to the third parties with
hope that if you locked down access to your network, you would automatically protect
applications, data and resources [5]. Outsiders are not always the only bad guys, insiders
commit the majority of computer security breaches. According to CSI/FBI 2003 survey, nearly
80% of computer security breaches are done by insiders [6]. Defense in depth network

2
perimeter security allows to protect your network with multiple layers of security such that if
one layer of security is compromised or hackers was able to get through it, another layers of
security is there to further protect the network. In this research, we make use of different
security vendor (Cisco & Palo Alto) to achieve our multiple layer defense in depth network
perimeter security. One of the advantages of using different vendors is to provide an additional
level of security such that an attack that could pass through a security vendor devices because
of a known bug might not be available to pass through the other security vendor devices and
thereby providing more security for the network.
Justification of the Study
The complexities of cyber-attacks are increasing every day, hackers are working
around the clock developing hacking tools and new way of how to break into the assumed
most secured network. Events in the last few months have proved that even the most secured
network are still prone to cyber-attacks, recent examples include the Equifax hack [7], the
alleged Russian Cyber hack on U.S Electoral system [8], the Yahoo account hack [9]. In fact,
Kevin G. Coleman

[10] reported a statement credited to Casteel; a manager at SCADA that

"We would never be able to completely get ahead of cyber criminals perpetuating cyber
attacks". Casteel statement is a call for more research and awareness in the area of cyber
security, improve security techniques and strategies in order to combat security attacks. Yet,
there are not enough skilled people to combat this increasing cyber-attack menace, in fact,
according to Tripwire study

(11],

75

percent of organizations lack skilled cyber security

experts.
Academic institutions, especially universities, are beginning to realize the urgent need
for more research and programs in cyber security to develop and design cyber security
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techniques and strategies to combat cyber security attacks and thereby producing cyber
security graduates with the necessary skills to meet up the increasing challenge of cyber
attacks. Eastern Illinois University started a Cyber Security Master's program under the School
of Technology to meet its responsibility of producing graduates capable of fulfilling the world
challenges in this area. This study will contribute to the Cyber Security Ms. Program by
developing a defense in depth network perimeter security design for practical learning among
different courses within the program. Providing laboratory training would further reinforce
and expose students to different technologies used in most organizations [ 12]. This. study will
implement a typical enterprise branch-headquarters defense in depth network perimeter
security and would help the students to gain practical experience on a typical network scenario
that they might come across after their graduation.
Overall Aim
This thesis will propose a defense in depth network perimeter security design for the
new Master of Science Cyber Security at Eastern Illinois University. This study is advancing
on previous design and works by incorporating cyber security technology such as IPSec Site
to Site Virtual Private Network (VPN), Remote Access VPN, and Network Security Device
High Availability. This thesis will provide the student with a real life practical experience and
exposure they might come across after the completion of their program.
Objectives
1. Design a defense in depth network perimeter security architectuie with a VPN solution
to a simulated branch site for the MSc Cyber Security Laboratory at EIU.
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2. Develop a perimeter security architecture as a practice network scenario to learn cyber
security technologies such as IPSec Site-to-Site VPN, Remote Access VPN, Network
Security Device High Availability, and Network device hardening.

3.

Design and develop at least ten different laboratory guides comprising of how to use
the designed perimeter network. Some of the laboratory guides includes packet
filtering, NAT, HTTP Inspection etc. using cisco ASA and Palo Alto firewalls.

4. Simulate using the developed architecture cyber security attacks.
5. Recommend a detailed future work and development of the laboratory.
Hypothesis
The intent of this research is to ascertain the following:
It is possible to:

1. Develop a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer a high
resiliency to cyber-attacks within academic setting of the EIU Cyber Security
Laboratory.

2. Develop a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer high availability
for the network security devices and thereby continuously protecting against cyber
attacks in event of failure of one of the security device.

3.

Develop and test a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer multi
vendor layered security and thereby providing security against cyber-attacks in event
hackers breaks through a security vendor device.

4.

Develop, test and simulate an IPSec site-to-site VPN that offers secure communication
over unsecured internet network.

5
5.

Provide students with cyber-attacks real experience, and to teach them how to further
improve cyber security systems based on the EIU laboratory ·experience.
Delimitations
This research would strictly provide a design for a defense in depth network perimeter

security for the purpose of testing how a multilayer defense could protect against network
attacks, and would not discuss the speed or the full implementation of the designed system.
Also the Palo Alto used in the design (PA 200) is limited to HA lite; that is, it cannot do a
stateful high availability. In addition, just basic security such

as

port security would be

configured on the switch, and no extensive switch security would be considered.
There is also the possibility that hackers launch sophisticated attackers that can break
the security of designed system due to the fact that we do not have the latest IOS security
versions and updated equipment.
There is also possibility that no hackers will launch an attack to the designed system,
although past experiences have demonstrated that hackers have very quickly found and attack
our network.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Cyber Security and its Challenges
Cyber security is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from
attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive
information;

extorting

money

from users;

or

interrupting

normal

business processes.

Implementing effective cyber security measures is particularly challenging today because there
are more devices than people, and attackers are becoming more innovative

[15].

The twenty first century has seen a new dimension of warfare; the cyber warfare.
Developed countries have started exploiting the vulnerabilities of cyberspace to gain supremacy
and influence over the rivals and over countries. Projects like PRISM and Boundless
Information and malwares like Stuxnet and Distrack have surprised the world by revealing how
the cyberspace is being exploited by developed countries

[14]. Reliance of developing countries

on a reliable and secure cyberspace do not match with that of western world but still few of
their critical organizations like national, military and private sector hold significant share in
cyberspace. Mostly, these developing countries rely on the products developed b y western
world. The dependency has inherent vulnerabilities and opportunities which place their critical
organizations vulnerable to cyber exploitation

[14].

The Internet of Things (IoT) has been the major subject in the IT world, with the reality
of IoT there would be more complexity as more devices than ever are expected to be
interconnected. According to Folk et al

[13],

over a billion devices are expected to be

interconnected, and with this comes unimaginable exploits, vulnerabilities, and attacks.
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A successful cyber security approach has multiple layers of protection spread across the
computers, networks, program, or data that one intends to keep safe. In an organization, the
people, processes, and technology must all complement one another to create an effective
defense from cyber-attacks

[13].
Notable Cyber Attacks

Bombshell hacks were revealed one after another in 2017, from an Equifax breach that
compromised almost half the country to global ransom campaigns that cost companies millions
of dollars. The cyber-attacks highlighted the alarming vulnerability of our personal information.
More tools used by government hackers have become public, and it's easier than ever to
create sophisticated ways to spread malware or ransomware or steal data from companies.
Companies also frequently fail to patch security flaws in a timely manner

(16]. Mark

Nunnikhoven said as we do more and more of our business online, and as criminals realize the
value of the data that organizations are protecting, we're seeing more big-name breaches, more
high-profile breaches [ 17).
In particular, ransomware when hackers demand money to unlock files is becoming
more common. In

2017,

Bitdefender, an antivirus software firm found out that ransomware

payments hit $2 billion twice as much as in 2016 and it was predicted by trend micro that it will
exceed $9 billion the following year

(18].

Cybercriminals penetrated Equifax, one of the largest credit bureaus, in July and stole
the personal data of

145 million people [161. It was considered among the worst breaches of all

time because of the amount of sensitive information exposed, including Social Security
numbers. The company only revealed the hack two months later. This attack could have an
impact for years because the stolen data could be used for identity theft.
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The Equifax breach raised concerns over the amount of information data brokers collect
on consumers, which can range from public records to mailing addresses, birth dates and other
personal details. Firms like Equifax, TransUnion and Experian sell that data to customers, such
as banks, landlords and employers, so they can learn more about each and every one. Whether
data brokers do enough to keep that private information secure is under scrutiny ( 1 6].
Cellebrite is a company that produces devices that can pull personal data from mobile
phones to be use by the military and the government. The company fell victim to their own
game when their external web server was hacked and 900GB of customer information and
technical product data was taken ( 1 9].
NHS -Though not targeted specifically at the NHS, the WannaCry Ransomware most
notably struck the UK health service, preventing workers from accessing their computers and
delaying vital medical procedures. Fortunately, a flaw in its mechanism allowed experts to
create a kill switch (19].
In

June,

a

security

researcher

discovered

almost

200

million

voter

records exposed online after a GOP data firm misconfigured a security setting in its Amazon
cloud storage service. It was the latest in a string of major breaches stemming from insecure
Amazon servers where data is stored. They are secure by default, but Chris Vickery, a
researcher at cybersecurity firm UpGuard, regularly finds that companies set it up wrong [20].
Cyber Attacks Mitigating Techniques
There are several techniques or technology that are always been deployed by the
government, cooperate bodies and individuals in order to mitigate cyber-attacks and keep their
network and resources safe. Some of these technologies are discussed below.
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) Techniques

A virtual private network, or VPN, is an encrypted connection over the lnternet from a
device to a network. The encrypted connection helps ensure that sensitive data is safely
transmitted. It prevents unauthorized people from eavesdropping on the traffic and allows the
user to conduct work remotely

121).

VPN technology is widely used in corporate environments

where regional offices are connected over unsecure connection such as internet as shown in
Figure 2.1 12111221.

Internet VPN
lutcrnrl

Head-offc e
Reg1<>nal
Olf1ce

Remote I roaming users
Figure

2. I VPN site to site and from roaming users.
Firewall Technology

A firewall is a network security system Lhat monitor and controls incoming and
outgoing network traffic based on predetermined security rules

[221.

A firewall typically

establishes a ban-ier between a trusted internal network and untrusted external network, such as
the Internet

l23 j. Cheswick and Bellovin

(24]

define a firewall as a collection of components

or a system that is placed between two networks as shown in Figure

2.2

and Figure

possesses the following properties:

•All traffic from inside to outside, and vice-versa, must pass through it.

2.3, and
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•Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, is allowed to pass through it.
•The firewall itself is immune to penetration.
Traditional network firewalls prevent unauthorized access and attacks by protecting
the points of entry into the network.

WAN

Figure 2. 2 Firewall location in a network.
DMZ

Internal Firewall

External Firewall

Figure 2. 3 The DMZ.
Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) defined as a device or software application which
monitors the network or system activities and finds if there is any malicious activity occur.
Outstanding growth and usage of internet raises concerns about how to communicate and
protect the digital information safely. In today's world hackers use different types of attacks for
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getting the valuable information. Many of the intrusion detection techniques, methods and
algorithms help to detect those several attacks

[25].

An IDS is referred as burglar alarm. For example the lock system in the house protects
the house from theft. But if somebody breaks the lock system and tries to enter into the house,
it is the burglar alarm that detects that the lock has been broken and alerts the owner by raising
an alarm.

[26]. Anderson [27] introduced the concept of intrusion detection

in

1980. He has

been the first showing the importance of security audit trails in the aim of detecting policy
violation. He defined a violation of policy security as a deliberate unauthorized attempt to: access information - manipulate information - make a system unreliable or unusable. Debar et
al

[28] also

described an intrusion-detection system as a detector that processes information

coming from system that is to be protected. This detector uses three kinds of information:
•Technique used to detect intrusion (for example signature database),
• Configuration information about the current state of system,
• Audit trail.
The detector eliminates all unnecessary information, determines if this action can be
considered as a symptom of an intrusion, and takes an action (send alerts for example). Several
types of IDS technologies exist due to the variance of network configurations. Each type has
advantages and disadvantage in detection, configuration, and cost. Mainly, there are three
important distinct families of IDS: The types of IDPS technologies are differentiated primarily
by the types of events that they monitor and the ways in which they are deployed

[29].

The first family of IDSs is Host based IDS which monitors signs of intrusion in the local
system. For analysis they use host system's logging and other information, the host based
handler is referred to as the sensor. Other sources, from which a host-based sensor can obtain
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data, include system logs and other logs generated by operating system processes and contents
of objects not reflected in standard operating system audit and logging mechanisms [30]. Host
based system trust strongly on audit trail. The information of the logs allows the intrusion
detection system to spot subtle patterns of misuse that would not be visible at a higher level of
abstraction (31]. As shown in Figure 2.4, the elementary principle in IDS including Network
Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) originated from anomaly HIDS research based on
Denning' s pioneering work [32]. A host-based IDS provides much more relevant information
than Network-based IDS. HIDS are used efficiently for analyzing the network attacks, for
example, it

can

sometimes tell exactly what the attacker did, which commands he used, what

files he opened, rather than just a vague accusation and there is an attempt to execute a
dangerous command [33). It is less risky to configure.
Advantages of Host based Intrusion Detection Systems:
• Verifies success or failure of an attack
•Monitors System Activities
•Detects attacks that a network based IDS fail to detect
•Near real time detection and response
•Typically, does not require additional hardware
•Lower entry cost.
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2. 4 Host Based IDS.

The second family of IDSs is the Network based IDS systems, they collect information
from the network itself rather than from each separate host.

The NIDS audits the network

attacks while packets moving across the network. As shown in Figure 2.5. the network sensors
come equipped with attack signatures that are rules on what will constitute an attack and most
network-based systems allow advanced users to define their own signatures

[34]. Attack on the

sensor is based on signature and they are from the previous attacks and the operation of the
monitors will be transparent to the users and this is also significant [35]. The transparency of
the monitors decreases the likelihood that an adversary will be able to locate it and nullify its
capabilities without the efforts [31]. Network Node IDS (NNIDS) agents are deployed on every
host within the network being protected [34].
Advantages of Network based Intrusion Detection Systems:
•Lower cost of ownership
• It is easier to deploy
• It detect network based attacks
• It retain evidence
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• It provides real time detection and quick response
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Figure 2. 5 A NIDS.
The third family of IDSs is the Application based IDS (APIDS), they check the effective
behavior and event of the protocol. The system or agent is placed between a process and group
of servers that monitors and analyzes the application protocol between devices f34]. Intentional
attacks are the malignant attacks carried out by disgruntled employees to cause harm to the
organization and unintentional attack causes financial damage to the organization for example
by deleting the important data files

[34].

Intrusion Prevention Systems
Many enterprise network systems and end user devices remain susceptible to a myriad
of known attacks due to a simple failure to patch known vulnerabilities, outdated equipment
and malware signatures, or failure to properly setup and deploy security devices. Since known
vulnerabilities are typically well documented, anyone
unpatched systems

[ 36].

can

download ready-made tools to attack
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Newer blended threats and Advanced Persistent Threats, or APTs, use multiple old and
new attack methods simultaneously, targeting specific data and even individuals within
organizations. Therefore, both traditional and advanced security measures working together are
especially important when defending networks against these new types of multifaceted and
persistent attacks. Surveys verify the effectiveness of these new attacks, showing that in
the average cost of a data breach reached

2010,

$214 per compromised record. and averaged $7 .2

million per data breach event, an increase of 6% over

2009

l37].

When developing a security

strategy, organizations must plan to protect against not just current threats, but all threats,
known and unknown.
Intrusion prevention system (IPSs) are an amalgam of security technologies, their goal
is to anticipate and to stop attacks [38]. Instead of analyzing the traffic logs, as an IDS which
lies in discovering the attacks after they took place, an Intrusion Prevention System tries to
warn and prevent against such attacks. While the systems of intrusion detection try to give the
alert, the Intrusion Prevention Systems block the traffic rated dangerous. Over many years, the
philosophy of the intrusions detection on the network amounted to detect as many as possible
of attacks and possible intrusions and to consign them so that others take the necessary
measures. On the contrary, the systems of prevention of the intrusions on the network have been
developed in a new philosophy "taking the necessary measures to counter attacks or detectable
intrusions with precision

"[38].

In general terms, IPS are always online on the network to

supervise the traffic and intervene actively by limiting or deleting the traffic judged hostile by
interrupting the suspected sessions or by taking other reaction measures to an attack or an
intrusion. An IPS functions symmetrically to the IDS; in addition to that, they analyze
connection contexts, automatize the logs analysis and suspend the suspected connections.
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The need to protect data and networks, and the need to stop attacks and prevent it is the
reason that the IPS was created [39). A Firewall act like IPS, but an IPS focus on attack
prevention at layers that most firewalls are not able to decipher, at least not yet [40). There are
many types of IPS like inline network intrusion detection system, application-based
firewalls/IDS, layer seven switches, network-based application IDSs, and deceptive
applications. An IPS is typically designed to operate completely invisibly on a network. IPS
products do not typically claim an IP address on the protected network but may respond
directly to any traffic in a variety of ways. As mentioned before, IPS products have ability
to implement firewall rules, but it is not a core function of IPS. Also, IPS offer deeper watching
and monitoring capabilities into network operations like bad logons, inappropriate content and
many other network and application layer functions [41]. An IPS prevents a large amount of
downtime that would occur if it were not there, this is done by stopping any damage that may
have made its way to the databases from internal or even external attacks. An IPS also makes
it easier for the administrators to see where attacks are coming from so that they can address
them and prevent any further attacks from that location f 42]. An IPS device must use
inspection to perform advanced protection against new types of attacks. It performs TCP
segment reassembly, traffic analysis, application protocol validation, and signature
matching to identify the attack [43].
A Host IPS solutions (HIPS) as shown in Figure 2.6 is designed to protect critical
systems and applications by blocking attack at the host and are considered the last line of
defense, it can handle encrypted and unencrypted traffic equally, because it can analyze the data
after it has been decrypted on the host [ 43 ].
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Figure 2. 6 A HIPS.
NIPS do not use processor and memory on computer hosts but uses its own CPU and
memory. NIPS are a single point of failure, which is considered a disadvantage; however, this
property also makes it simpler to maintain. However, this attribute applies to all network devices
like routers and switches and can be overcome by implementing the network accordingly. NIPS
can detect events scattered over the network and can react, whereas with a HIPS, only the host's
data itself is available to make a decision. It would take too much time to report it to a central
decision making engine and report back to block [44]. So, when we deploy both network
and host IPS technologies they will provides the greatest level of protection for critical
data and critical applications. Wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) prevent
unauthorized network access to local area networks and other information a ets by wireless
devices [451.
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A Network I PS a s sho wn in Figure 2.7, perform s in-line in spection of network traffic in
a near-real-time manner, the in spection identifies attacks u si ng known vulnerabilities of
commonly u sed so ftwa re products and protocol s, a s well a s k no wn attack patterns with unusual
act ivity based on connection sequence s or traffic volume [42j. Intrusion Prevention System s
are considered extensions o f Intrusio n Detection Systems because both sy stem s mo nitor
net work tra ffic a nd/or sy stem activity for threats. The primary d ifference bet ween the t wo
sy stems i s that Intrusion Prevention Sy stems are placed in-li ne and are therefore a ble to actively
prevent/block intrusions that are detected. More spec ifically, an I PS can take such actions a s
se nding an alarm, dropping malicious packets, resetting the connection

and/or blocking traff ic

from an offending I P addre ss. An I PS can also correct Cyclic Redu ndancy Check (CRC) e rrors,
de fragment packet streams, prevent T C P sequenc ing i ssue s, and clea n u p unwa nted tra nsport
and network layer o ptions 1 40].
The de ployment of an I PS is very effect ive techni que to protect databases and networks
from unauthorized u sers. It is u sed in ma ny orga n izations to keep its o wn data secure. An I PS
like a ny other development, it has some limitations a nd many advantages. Combining network
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and h ost fPS technol ogy results in the m ost comprehensive and robust defensive posture.
Implementing and deploying proa ctive fPS technol ogies will result in fewer su ccessful
attacks, m ore efficient u e of security resources, and l ower operating costs than sirnply
deploying a single, limited technol ogy and h oping t o avoid an attack. C ombining IPS, IDS and
Firewall technol ogies will provide a strong de fense line t o protect systems from any attack, for
example firewall play as first defense line that connect t o the se cond defense line IDS, and first
and se cond lines conne ct t o the third defense line IPS. C ombining these three technol ogies
will generate a great protection f or any system. Generally an IPS is very useful when
implemented in large networks [42].
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CHAPTER

Ill

METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes in details the methodology deployed in carrying out the
objectives of this research. It is explained in a way that it can be easily reproduce if the need
arises.
The Design Topology
Figure 3 . 1 shows this thesis's design topology, it consist of a layered approach using
different vendor security devices to provide a defense in depth network perimeter security
mechanism l46]. Network perimeter security should be designed to avoid a single point of
failure. This design topology takes into account that by deploying different vendor security
devices, an attack that could compromise one security device from a vendor might not be able
to compromise other security device from other vendor. According to Conklin et al [46], the
inadequacies of one security device could be complemented by other security devices from the
whole architecture. Conklin also advocates that network security systems architecture should
have the following layers;
• Routers
• Firewall
• Network segments referred to as perimeter security
• IDSs
• Encryption
• Authentication software
• Physical security and traffic control
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Figure 3. 1 The Topology for the Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security for the EIU
Cyber Security Lab
The Router
In

this research, a cisco router 28 1 1 has been used. The cisco 28 1 1 has the capacity to

deliver secure data and great mobility. It comes with 2 integrated 10/100 fast Ethernet ports. In
this research, the cisco router provide the following functions:
The EIU Main Computer Gateway Router
The EIU main campus gateway router in the design topology routes traffic into the
designed network and processes traffic to the outside network when originated from the inside
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network. As shown in Figure 3 . 1 , the fast Ethernet 0/0 port is connected to an ISP that provides
internet service for the designed lab. The interface is connected to a wireless bridge that connect
wirelessly to the Verizon wireless hotspot for the purpose of internet access. The router fast
Ethernet 0/0 port was configured as dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) client
receiving IP address automatically from the Verizon wireless hotspot through the wireless
bridge it is connected to. The IP address assigned by the Verizon hotspot is a private IP address
in the range 192.168.1.0/24. A Public IP address is usually required to be able to route traffic
to the internet. Since the IP address assigned is a private address, a Network Address Translation
technique (NAT) is needed to translate the private IP address to a public address, this also serve
as a form of security which protect the inside network IP address from being know to the outside
network. The Verizon hotspot device provides this translation inbuilt, which means all traffic
from the assigned private IP address will be translated to a public IP address. The NAT
technique used by Verizon is Port Address Translation (PAT) which translate all the private
assigned IP addresses in the range of 192.168.1 .0/24 into a single public address to get to the
internet. The router interface fast Ethernet 011 port was configured with the IP address
90.0.1 .2/29, this interface connect directly to the Palo Alto firewall/IDS.
Port Translation to the Web Server
As shown in Figure 3 . 1 , a webserver is placed in the DMZ zone of the network with an
assigned private lP address 172.16.1 .2/24. The private l P address will not allow external users
to access this webserver. In order for external users to be able to access the webserver, the router
is configured to have a public address representation for the webserver such that traffic sent to
this public IP address will be translated to the private IP address of the webserver. In order for
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the traffic originating from the outside or internet to successfully communicate with the
webserver, the following process would have to take place;
1 . The internet traffic destined to the webserver i s first directed to the webserver's public IP
address.
2. This traffic is then redirected to the router fast Ethernet 0/0 interface, this is made
possible with the concept of port forwarding which was configured in the Verizon
hotspot by directing all internet traffic to the router fast Ethernet 0/0 192.168. 1 . 1 5 1 IP
address as shown Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3 . 2 Port forwarding configuration on the Verizon hotspot
When the traffic get redirected to the router fast Ethernet 0/0, the traffic is then further
redirected to the web server. The explanation on how this is achieved will be provided as we
proceed through the chapter.
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The Gateway Router NAT Configuration
In order for the traffic directed to the fast Ethernet 0/0 interface of the router to be
redirected to the webserver, Network Address Translation is configured on the router. The IP
address 192.168. 1 . 1 5 1 on the faO/O interface is translated into the IP address 90.0.1.2 on
interface faO/l which is directly connected to the Palo Alto firewall/IDS.
The Palo Alto Firewall/IDS
In the design topology, a Palo Alto 200 (PA-200) device is used as second layer of security. A
PA-200 has the capacity to function as a firewall as well as an intrusion detection system (IDS).
It is capable of filtering/blocking malicious website or URL and also comes with denial of
service mitigating features. The following configurations were done on the Palo Alto firewall
device to achieve its purpose for this research.
Interfaces and Zone Configuration
The Palo Alto device was configured with three different zones based on the design
topology; the Trust Zone, the Untrusted Zone, and the DMZ Zone. The Ethernet interface 1/1
(El/1) was configured as the Untrusted Zone which is connected to the gateway router, the
Ethernet interface 1/2 (El/2) was configured as the trusted zone, and Ethernet interface 1/3
(El/3) was configured as the DMZ zone. The zones segmented the network and ensures that
traffic going to a zone does not crosses to another zone. For example, when the webserver is
placed at the DMZ zone, it ensures that traffic destined to it does not get to the trusted zone,
this provide security for the internal users located in the trusted zone. The following steps
explain how to configure the zones and the interfaces.
l . On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Network Tab
2. Click on the zone tab on the left side pane
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3. Click the add button to create a new zone as shown in Figure 3.3

Narre DMz!
Type Layer3
Interfaces ....

Zone Protecbon Profile r:one
Loq Setting None

.

L Enable User Ident1flcabon

--

Figure 3. 3 Creating a Zone
4. Name it, for example, DMZ and then select type as layer 3 and then click ok
5. Now to configure the interface, click the interface tab on the left hand side panel
6. Click on the interface to be configure, for example Ethernet 1 1 1 , select the zone you
want the interface to be associated with.
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Figure 3. 4 Interface configuration

7. Click on the 1Pv4 Tab
8. Click on add to configure IP address on the interface, then click OK
- -
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Figure 3. 5 IP address configuration on the interface
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9. Repeat the above steps to create the other zones and to configure other interfaces.
Routing Configuration: Virtual Router
For the Palo Alto to route traffic from one zone to the other, it needs to understand how
to route the traffic. Static routing is implemented and three static routes were configured: one
of the static route routes traffic to any destination on the internet using the router fa0/1 interface
IP address as the default gateway, the second static route routes traffic to the 172.16.32.0
network that is connected between the IDS/IPS device (Cisco ASA) and the internal router using
ASA outside interface gig0/1 IP address as the default gateway and the third static route routes
traffic to the 10.234.100.0/24 network using cisco ASA outside interface gigO/l as the default
gateway. The following steps show how to configure the static routes;
1 . On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Network Tab
2. Click on the Virtual Router tab on the left side panel as shown in Figure 3.6
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Figure 3. 6 Virtual Routers
3. Click add and give it a name as shown in Figure 3.7
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Figure 3. 7 YirtuaJ Router Configuration

4. Click on static routes
5. Give your static route a name and configure the static route details as shown Figure 3.8
6. Then click ok.
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Figure 3. 8 Static Route configuration
Repeat all the steps above for the other static routes.
The virtual router has been created, now we need to attach the interfaces to the virtual
router created.
7. Click on the interface tab on the left hand side of the panel and then click on an interface
to edit it to attach it to the created virtual router as shown in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3 . 9 Attaching an interface to a Virtual Router

NAT Configuration and Security Policies
The Palo Alto was configured with a bidirectional NAT to translate the webserver fP
address 172.16.1.2 to the IP address on the untrusted zone which is 90.0. l . 1 when traffic is
originating or returning from the webserver. Traffic from the internet destined to the web erver
will first be translated to the gateway router interface faO/O which is 192.168. 1 . 1 5 1 which also
has been configured to redirect the traffic to the Palo Alto untrusted interface which is 90.0. 1 . 1
and then it i s port forwarded to the webserver.
Security policies was configured to allow or deny traffic between the zones. The
following are the security policies configured as shown in Figure 3.10
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Figure 3. 1 0 Security Policies
All traffic that doesn't match these rules would be dropped.
Denial of Services (DoS) Protection Profile
The Palo Alto was also configured to mitigate against denial of service attack. The detail
configuration steps is as follows;
1 . On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Object tab
2. Click the DoS protection tab
3. Click add

4. Name the DoS protection profile
5. Check the aggregate button to select it
6.

Under the flood protection tab, check the buttons for SYN flood, UDP flood, ICMP
flood and other IP flood tabs.

7. Click on resource protection tab and check the session button, then click OK.
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DoS Protection Profile

�

Name DoS_Pro:ection
Description

Other IP Flood
"' Other IP Flood

Alarm Rate 10000
(packets/sec)

Activate Ral:e 10000
(packets/sec)
MaXJmal Rate
(packets/sec)

40000

Block Durabon 300
(seconds)

Figure 3. 1 1 DoS Protection configuration
Webserver Configuration
The webserver used for this research is hosted on a virtual machine running on Kali
Linux Operating System. The system hosting the virtual machine is a core i7 Intel processor,
with 8GB RAM and 1TB hard disk size with a windows server 2012 R2 Operating System. The
webserver is configured with an IP address 172. 1 6 . 1 .2/24 and a vulnerable web application is
installed on the webserver, it is the content of this webserver that loads whenever a request is
made to the public webserver IP address.

"
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Cisco ASA Firewall Configuration and the Internal Router
The Cisco ASA firewall/JPS is a cisco 5 5 1 2-x device that has an IPS sensor that comes
with over 6000 signatures in its database. It is configured to allow traffic to flow from the inside
and to the outside network while it is configured to block all other traffic. The interfaces has
been configured to segment traffic flow.
Interface gig0/1 is connected to the Palo Alto and is configured as outside with a security
level of 0, this means that traffic coming from this interface will not be trusted. Interface gig0/3
is connected to the internal router and is configured as inside with a security level of 100, this
means traffic from this interface will be trusted. The ASA is configured to allow VPN traffic
from the remote site to the Internal LAN network and also traffic from the inside network is
allowed by default to go out to the internet.
The internal router is also a Cisco 28 1 1 router just like the gateway router. The internal
router serves as the gateway between the internal users and the outside network. It also serve as
a point of security, filtering traffic be default and only configured traffic is allowed to cross the
router interface network segment.
The EIU Satellite Campus Gateway Router and the Firewall/IDS
As shown in Figure 3 . 1 2, the EIU satellite campus gateway router is a Cisco 28 1 1 router
and is configured similarly to the EIU main campus gateway router. The interface fast Ethernet
010 is connected to the wireless bridge and get an IP address through a dynamic host
configuration protocol. The interface fast Ethernet 011 is connected directly to a Palo Alto
firewall which also serves as an intrusion detection system. The interface fa0/1 is configured
with an IP address of 80.0.1 .2/29. Network address translation is also configured on it to allow
the inside network to be able to reach the internet.
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Figure 3. 1 2 EIU Satellite Campus Champaign
The EIU satellite campus firewall/IDS used is Palo Alto 200 same used in the EIU Main
campus site as shown in Figure 3 . 1 2. Interface eth l / l is configured as the untrusted zone while
interface eth 112 is configured as the trusted zone. Security policies such as allowing traffic to
pass through from the trusted zone to the untrusted zone was also configured just like how it
was configured on the EIU main campus Palo Alto as shown in the design topology.
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Virtual Private Network
As shown in the design topology, the main campus network is connected to the satellite
campus network via IPSec Site to Site VPN. The VPN is terminated on the gateway routers on
each sites. On each of the gateway routers, IPSec phase 1 is configured which defined the
isakmp policies such as the authentication method which is a pre-share authentication method,
hash algorithm, symmetric algorithm and the diffie hellman group. Then the pre-share key is
defined and also the traffic to be protected is also defined which is the traffic from the main
campus internal LAN network to the satellite campus internal LAN network and vice versa.
Then IPSec phase 2 is configured which defined the IPSec policies such as the
encryption method, the tunnel mode. ESP encryption method is used while the default tunnel
mode is used. The IPSec is applied to the interface connected to the ISP which is interface faO/O
on both routers. Traffic from the main campus LAN network going to the satellite campus LAN
network is being protected and vice versa traffic from the satellite campus network traffic to the
main campus LAN network.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This research has been able to achieve a major milestone in developing a laboratory for
the Cyber Security program at EIU based on the available resources at the disposal as at the time
of implementing this research. The research was able to simulate two sites connected over IPSec
site to site VPN over the internet. The design has its own internet connection and makes it
isolated from the ElU network. Internal LAN users are able to access the intemet and can
communicate with each other.
Results and Discussion
A major milestone in this research was that two simulated sites with real commercial
equipment and a true internet connection were built and would serve as a test ground to launch
cyber-attacks to each other. It will also serve to with tand attacks from the outsider or at least in
the future record attacks to learn hacker's behavior. The sites can communicate to the internet
and can also access each other through an lPsec site to site VPN. One of the vision of the cyber
security program is to have a laboratory with two simulated sites which can be used to simulate
cyber-attacks to each other for learning. This research has accomplished having this two sites
implemented within the available resources. While this research could not go further with
simulating cybcr-attacks between each sites, connectivity between each sites was implemented
and tested and it is hoped that further research in this project will dwell on this. Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2 show the results of internal LAN users in EIU Main campus site and EIU Satellite
Campus Champaign pinging www.google.com respectively proving that the internal users can
access the external network on both sites.
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Figure 4. 1 EIU Main Campus Internal LAN User ( 1 0.234. 1 00.50/24) ping www.google.com
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Figure 4. 2 EIU Satellite Campus Champaign lntemal LAN User ( 10.234.200.50/24) ping
www.google.com
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The Figure 4.3 shows EIU Internal LAN users accessing the webserver through the
private address of the webserver ( 172.16.1 .2).
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Apache2 Debian Default Page

This is the default welcome page used to test the correct operation of the Apache2 server after
installation on Debian systems. If you can read this page, 1t means that the Apache HTIP server
installed at this site is worl<ing properly. You should replace this file (located at
/vu/www/html/index.html) before continuing to operate your HTIP server.

If you are a normal user of this web site and don't know what this page 1s about this probably means
that the Site is currendy unava�able due to maintenance. If the problem pel'Slsts, please cxmtact the
site's administrator.

,

Debian's Apache2 default configuration 1s different from the upstream default configuration, and split
into several files optinmed for interatnon with Deblan tools. The configuraoon system is fully

documented in /usr/share/doc/apache2/llEADME.Debian.gz. Refer to tills fOI' the full
documentaoon. Doamentabon '°'the web seNer itself can be found by accesng
si the manual 1f the
apacho2-dr<: package was installed on this server.

The configuration layout fOI' an Apache2 web server 1nstallation on Debtan systems is as follows:
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Figure 4. 3 EIU Main Campus Internal User accessing the Webserver through Private IP address
172. 1 6 . 1 .2
The public IP address given by the ISP is 166.1 65.203 . 1 5 1 . External users from the
internet who want to access the webserver will be able to acces the webserver through this IP
address (166.1 65.203 . 1 5 1). As explained in chapter 3, this IP address will be redirected to the
private IP address of the webserver in the DMZ zone. Figure 4.4 shows a successful web access
from the internet to the webserver in the DMZ zone.
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Figure 4. 4 lntemet User access the webserver through the public IP address 166.165.203 . 1 5 1
To test the VPN connectivity between the two sites, internal users in both sites will send
pings to each other to test connectivity. The Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 shows successful ping
connectivity between the two internal LAN users.

41

Figure 4 . 5 EIU Main Campus Internal LAN User ( 1 0.234.100.50) pinging EIU Satellite Campus
Internal LAN user 1 0.234.200.50.
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Figure 4. 6 EIU Satellite Campus Internal LAN User ( 10.234.200.50) pinging EIU Main Campus
Internal LAN user 10.234.100.50.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this research is to develop a design topology that can be used for
laboratory practices for the cyber security program at EIU. The research fulfill this purpose by
building two remote sites which can be used to simulate cyber-attacks. Also the publicly access
webserver would also serve to invite hackers to hack into and serve to teach students the various
hackers bypass security firewall. Inside users can also use the webserver to test internal hacking.
The design developed would be a practical complement to the cyber security theoretical
knowledge studied in the class.
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Recommendation
In line with the primary focus of this designed topology, it is recommended that future
work on this research should focus more on cyber-attacks simulations of the design topology
between the two sites and also from the external source such as hackers from the internet. It is
also my recommendation that licenses of the security devices should be updated to aid the cyber
attack simulation. Modification can be done on the designed topology to further advance the
design and implementation.
More importantly, I strongly recommend a complimentary virtual environment to simulate
the designed topology and other laboratory practices for the cyber security practical learning. In
the course of the research and within the available resources at the disposal of the department, I
recommend GNS3 emulator software. Further research can be carried out on how this can be
deploy but it is realistically possible to implement without any issue of software image with cisco
or Palo Alto.
The following technology objectives could not be achieve as a result of the available
resources;
Network Device High Available: The license on the Cisco ASA would be need to be
upgrade to security plus to achieve this. With the GNS3 emulator this can be easily
achieve.
Remote Access VPN: The software version of the device used for the gateway router could
not accommodate the client VPN image due to low flash space. This can be upgraded or
a mode advanced router could be use.
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Appendix A - Definition of Terms
Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting systems, networks and programs from
digital attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying
sensitive information, extorting money from users, or interrupting normal business
processes.
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): A DMZ; sometimes referred to as a perimeter network is a physical
or logical subnetwork that contains and exposes an organization's external facing services
to an unsecure untrusted large network such as internet.
Firewall: Is a network device hardware, software, or a combination thereof whose purpose is to
enforce a security policy across its connections by allowing or denying traffic to pass into
or out of the network.
lntrusion Detection System (IDS): An intrusion detection system is a system that detects malicious
activity on a computer or network. It only detect and not prevent malicious activity.
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): An intrusion prevention system monitor network traffic for
malicious activities and when it detect a malicious activity it blocks it based on the
configuration.
Local Area Network (LAN): A local area network is a group of computers and associated devices
that connect together within a close proximity to each other.
Virtual Private Network (VPN): A VPN is a technology that creates an encrypted connection over
an unsecure network.
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Appendix B - Configuration of EIU Main Gateway Router
EIU_Main_Campus#sh run
Building configuration...
Current configuration : 2015 bytes
!

! Last configuration change at 19:36:34 UTC Fri Mar 9 2018
version 15 . 1
service timestamps debug datetime msec
service timestamps log datetime msec
no service password-encryption
I

hostname EIU_Main_Campus
I

boot-start-marker
boot-end-marker
I

no aaa new-model
dotl 1 syslog
ip source-route
!

ip cef
!

multilink bundle-name authenticated
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0
!

license udi pid CISC0281 1 sn FfX1040A2FO
!

redundancy
!

ip ftp usemame ben
ip ftp password password
!

crypto isakmp policy 1 0
encr aes
hash md5
authentication pre-share
group 2
crypto isakmp key cisco address 192.168.1.2 1 1
I

crypto ipsec transfonn-set MYTHES IS esp-aes esp-sha-hmac
I

crypto map MYMAP 10 ipsec-isakmp
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set peer 192.168. 1 .2 1 1
set transform-set MYTHESIS
match address VPN
interface FastEthemetO/O
ip address dhcp
ip nat outside
ip virtual-reassembly in
duplex auto
speed auto
crypto map MYMAP
'

interface FastEthemetO/l
ip address 90.0.1.2 255.255.255.248
ip nat inside
ip virtual-reassembly in
duplex auto
speed auto
!

interface FastEthemet0/0/0
no ip address
!

interface FastEthemet0/0/1
no ip address
!

interface FastEthemet0/012
no ip address
!

interface FastEthemet0/0/3
no ip address
!

interface Vlanl
no ip address
!

ip forward-protocol nd
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
!

ip nat inside source list 105 interface FastEthemetO/O overload
ip nat inside source static tcp 90.0. 1 . 1 80 192.168 . 1 . 1 5 1 80 extendable
ip route 10.144.1.0 255.255.255.248 90.0. 1 . 1
ip route 10.234.1 00.0 255.255.255.0 90.0. 1 . 1
ip route 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 192.168. 1 .2 1 1
ip route 172. 16.32.0 255.255.255.248 90.0. l . l
!

ip access-list extended VPN

•
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permit ip 10.234. 100.0 0.0.0.255 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255
'
access-list 105 deny ip 1 0.234.100.0 0.0.0.255 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255
access-list 105 permit ip any any
!

control-plane
'
line con 0

line aux 0
line vty 0 4
login
transport input all
!

scheduler allocate 20000 1 000
end
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Appendix C - Configuration of Cisco ASA Firewall
ASA-FW-IPS# sh run
: Saved
ASA Version 9. 1 (2)
!

hostname ASA-FW-IPS
enable password E.bgA9kfttKB/.vi encrypted
names

interface GigabitEthernetO/O
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!

interface GigabitEthernet0/1
nameif Outside
security-level 0
ip address 10.144. 1 . 1 255.255.255.248
'

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!

interface GigabitEthernet0/3
nameif Inside
security-level 100
ip address 172.16.32.2 255.255.255.248
interface GigabitEthernet0/4
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!

interface GigabitEthernet0/5
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!

interface ManagementO/O

SS
management-only
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address

I

ftp mode passive
access-list OUT-IN extended permit ip 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 10.234. 100.0 255.255.255.0
access-list OUT-IN extended permit ip 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.234. 100.0 255.255.255.0
access-list OUT-IN extended permit icmp 90.0.1.0 255.255.25S.248 any
access-list OUT-IN extended permit icmp 172.16.1.0 255.2S5.2SS.O any
pager lines 24
mtu Outside lSOO
mtu Inside 1500
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1
no asdm history enable
arp timeout 14400
no arp permit-nonconnected
access-group OUT-IN in interface Outside
route Outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.144.1.2 1
route Inside 10.234. 100.0 2S5.25S.2S5.0 172.16.32.1 1
route Outside 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.144.1.2 1
timeout xlate 3:00:00
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02
timeout sunrpc 0: 10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1 :00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01 :00
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPol icy
user-identity default-domain LOCAL
no snmp-server location
no sump-server contact
sump-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart warmstart
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite
crypto ca trustpool policy
telnet timeout S
ssh timeout 5
ssh key-exchange group dh-groupl-shal
console timeout 0
threat-detection basic-threat
threat-detection statistics access-list
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept
!

class-map inspection_default
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match default-inspection-traffic

I

policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map
parameters
message-length maximum client auto
message-length maximum 5 1 2
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
inspect dns preset_dns_map
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect skinny
inspect sunrpc
inspect xdmcp
inspect sip
inspect netbios
inspect tftp
inspect ip-options
inspect http
!

service-policy global_policy global
prompt hostname context
call-home reporting anonymous prompt 2
Cryptochecksum:954e4ed0d555296be604bb44f4f0012d
: end
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Appendix D

-

Configuration of Internal Router

Internal-Router#sh run
Building configuration ...
Current configuration : 1404 bytes
!

version 15. l
service timestamps debug datetime msec
service timestamps log datetime msec
no service password-encryption
!

hostname Internal-Router
boot-start-marker
boot-end-marker
no aaa new-model
dotl 1 syslog
ip source-route
!

ip cef
!

multilink bundle-name authenticated
!

crypto pki token default removal timeout 0
!

license udi pid CISC0281 1 sn FTX1040A2ET
username cisco password 0 cisco
!

redundancy
!

interface FastEthernetO/O
description Outside lnteface
ip address 172.16.32.1 255.255.255.248
ip nat outside
ip virtual-reassembly in
duplex auto
speed auto
I

interface FastEthemet0/1
description Inside Interface
ip address 10.234.100.1 255.255.255.0
ip nat inside
ip virtual-reassembly in
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duplex auto
speed auto

!

interface FastEthernet0/0/0
no ip address
I

interface FastEthernet0/0/1
no ip address
!

interface FastEthernet0/0/2
no ip address
!

interface FastEthemet0/0/3
no ip address
I

interface Vlanl
no ip address
I

ip forward-protocol nd
ip http server
ip http authentication local
no ip http secure-server
!

ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.16.32.2
ip route 10.144.1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2
ip route 90.0. 1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2
ip route 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2
!

control-plane
!

line con 0
line aux 0
line vty 0 4
login
transport input all
!

scheduler allocate 20000 1000
end
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Appendix E - Configuration of EIU Satellite Campus Gateway Router
Champaign_GatewayRouter#sh run
Building configuration...
Current configuration: 3609 bytes
!

version 15.1
service timestamps debug datetime msec
service timestamps log datetime msec
no service password-encryption
!

hostname Champaigne_GatewayRouter
!

boot-start-marker
boot-end-marker
!

enable password cisco
I

no aaa new-model
dotl 1 syslog
ip source-route
I

ip cef
I

multilink bundle-name authenticated
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0
!

crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-213188813
enrollment selfsigned
subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate- 2 1 3188813
revocation-check none
rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2 13 188813
!

crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-213188813
certificate self-signed 01
30820229 30820192 A0030201 02020101 30000609 2A864886 F7000101 05050030
303 l 2E30 2C060355 0403 1325 494F5320 53656C66 20536967 6E65642D 43657274
69666963 61746520 323 13331 38383831 33301E17 00313631 30303832 3 1 323132
365Al70D 32303031 303 1 3030 30303030 5A30303 1 2E302C06 03550403 1325494F
53205365 6C662053 69676E65 64204365 72746966 69636174 65203231 33313838
3831 3330 8 1 9F300D 06092A86 4886F70D 01010105 00038180 00308189 02818100
AE903C81 OOB7570A BAF9C235 9208006E OC0055A7 42639BOO OEDE2A33
A7D235FC
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OECC8431 C69847Bl FA05960A EOEBEOO l 80C17C74 2846C61 4 2C807B16 69B58A05
5B02EECE 6E2BE599 6E1 5AF65 OOB8A3F6 867CF508 F6B33CAB 70240155 04FAAA97
07A68032 4COC18B2 735FA9FO C6C935A7 35C1202E 1981FB2E 70B47533 1C001365
02030100 01A35330 5 1 300F06 03551 0 1 3 0 1 0 1 FF04 05300301 0 1 FF301F 0603551 0
23041830 1680147E 2012F70C 40E3A977 904E3BB5 C408C040 3 1048F30 10060355
1 00E04 16 04147E20 12F70C40 E3A97790 4E3BB5C4 08C04031 048F3000 06092A86
4886F700 01010505 0003 8 1 8 1 0042220E AD017AB1 32B4A3AO 13208F38 05ACF250
AD9E2380 7FCD606F 037A97EA 44A6E41 6 12B4BOB6 18016C75 B5588299 68096AE9
9B45AADO 2A77C885 954F60Al 04A32B90 4302C617 297E0254 EC804450 F593 1B36
37071 lFB E024C01 1 01CE9421 8E04BA22 07990253 EC508EC6 7E537C1 B EE78F609
202FCC58 B04E6CEO 9E8548A4 24
quit
license udi pid CISC0281 1 sn FrX1040A2F3
username cisco privilege 15 password 0 cisco
!

redundancy
!

crypto isakmp policy 1 0
set peer 192.168 . 1 . 1 5 1
set transform-set MYTHESIS
match address VPN
interface FastEthernetO/O
ip address dhcp
ip nat outside
ip virtual-reassembly in
duplex auto
speed auto
crypto map MYMAP
I

interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 80.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248
ip nat inside
ip virtual-reassembly in
duplex auto
speed auto
I

interface FastEthernet0/0/0
no ip address
!

interface FastEthernetO/O/ 1
no ip address
I

interface FastEthernet0/0/2
no ip address
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interface FastEthemet0/0/3
no ip address
!

interface Vlanl
no ip address
'

ip forward-protocol nd
ip http server
ip http authentication local
ip http secure-server
'

ip nat inside source list NAT interface FastEthemetO/O overload
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168. 1 . 1
ip route 10.234.100.0 255.255.255.0 192.168 . 1 . 1 5 1
i p route 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 80.0. 1 . 1
ip access-list exten9ed NAT
deny ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 10.234. 100.0 0.0.0.255
permit ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 any
ip access-list extended VPN
permit ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 10.234 . 1 00.0 0.0.0.255
!

no cdp run
'
control-plane
!

line con 0
line aux 0
line vty 0 4
privilege level 1 5
password cisco
login local
transport input telnet ssh
line vty 5 1 5
password cisco
login local
transport input all
·

!

scheduler allocate 20000 1000
end
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Appendix F - Laboratory Guidelines
NETWORK SECURITY
LABORATORY I: BUILDING THE NETWORK
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab exerci e is to introduce students to different network security
devices by having access to the network device and configuring the network device ip addresses.
Configuring the IP addresses of the network devices will expose students to some basic command
line and erve a a start to their introduction to different network security devices.
Assumption: It is assumed that students have some basic knowledge in networking.
Task:
The network topology below has been physically connected, configure and assign ip addresses to
interfaces of the network devices.
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NOTE: You need to connect a management computer to the console of the router to have access
to the command line interface of the router.
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EIU Main Campus Gateway Router
EIU_Main_Campus>enable
EIU_Main_Campus#Conf t
EIU_Main_Campus( config)#int faO/O
EIU_Main_Campus(config-it)#ip address dhcp
EIU_Main_Campus(config-if)#no hutdown
EIU_Main_Campus(config)#ex it
EIU_Main_Campus(config)#int fa0/1
EIU_Main_Campus(config-it)#ip address 90.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248
EIU_Main_Campus(config-it)#no shutdown
Palo Alto
You will need to connect physically to the management port of the Palo Alto and
configure your system IP address as follow:
Your System IP address: 192.168. 1 .2 and subnet mask of 255.255.255.0
Then go lo https:// 192.168.1.1 on your browser to access Palo Alto Web Portal.
Usemame/Password is admin/admin
The web page will appear as this:
Configure the interface as shown below.
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Cisco ASA
ASA-FW-IPS#conf t
ASA-FW-IPS(config)#int gig0/1
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#nameif Outside
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#security-level 0
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#ip address 10.144. 1 . 1 255.255.255.248
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#no shutdown
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#exit
ASA-FW-IPS(config)#int gig0/3
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#nameif Inside
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#security-level 100
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#ip address 172.16.32.2 255.255.255.248
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#no shutdown
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#exit
Internal Router
lnternal-Router>enable
lnternal-Router#conf t
Internal-Router(config)#int faO/O
Intemal-Router(config-if)#ip address 172.16.32.1 255.255.255.248
Intemal-Router(config-if)#no shutdown
Internal-Router(config-if)#exit
lntemal-Router(config)#int faO/l
Internal-Router(config-if)#ip address 10.234. 100. l 255.255.255.0
Intemal-Router(config-if)#no shutdown
lntemal-Router(config-if)#exit
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Champaigne Gateway Router
Champaigne_GatewayRouter>enable
Champaigne_GatewayRouter#conf t
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config)#int faO/O
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-it)#ip address dhcp
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-if)#no shutdown
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-if)#ex it
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config)#int faO/ 1
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-if)#ip address 80.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-if)#no shutdown
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-if)#exit
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config)#

Champaigne Palo Alto
Follow same procedure above to configure champaigne palo alto
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NETWORK SECURI'I Y
LABORATORY II: NAT: ACCESSING THE INTERNET
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab exercise is to introduce students to NAT; Network Address
Translation. NAT allow multiple private 1p address users to access the internet with a single shared
public ip address. We will also be introduce to static NAT. by statically NATting the private ip
address of the web server to our public ip address can be able to access the webserver with the
public ip address.
Assumption: It is assumed that students have some basic knowledge in networking.
Task:
The network topology below has been physically connected, configure NAT on the EIU Main
campus gateway router so that internal Ian zone can access the internet and users from the internet
can access the web server using the public ip address of int faO/O.
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Solution Guide
EIU Main Campus Gateway Router
Create Access-list for the permitted traffic
EIU_Main_Campus>enable
EIU_Main_Campus#Conf t
EIU_Main_Campus(config)# access-list 105 permit ip any any
The above access-list is permitting all traffic from the internal network to any network on
the internet.
Configure the NAT
EIU_Main_Campus(config-it)#int faO/O
EIU_Main_Campus(config-if)#ip nat outside
EIU_Main_Campus(config-if)#exit
Boundary_Router(config)#int faO/l
Boundary_Router(config-if)#ip nat inside
Boundary_Router(config-if)#ex it
Boundary_Router(config)# ip nat inside source list 105 interface FastEthernetO/O
overload
NAT Overloading or Port Addre�s Translation ( PAT) is a modified form of
dynamic NAT where the number of inside local addresses is greater than the number of
inside global addresses. Mostly, there is just a single inside global IP address providing
Internet access to all in ide hosts.
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Now configure Static NAT for internet users to be able to access the web server with EIU
Main Gateway router public facing interface ip address.
Boundary_Router(config)# ip nat inside source static tcp 90.0. 1 . l 80 192.168. 1 . 1 S l 80
extendable
Here the router is configured to NAT to the Palo Alto Outside interface (90.0. 1 . 1 ) which
is then configure to do static NATting to the web server which is 172.16. l .2.
Configure the static NAT on Palo Alto to the web server
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ASA FIREWALL
LAB 1 : AUTO NAT AND MANUAL NAT
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab is to learn how to configure Network Address Translation
in ASA firewall. As we have learnt in previous lab how to configure it in a cisco router, we are
going to learn how it is configured in ASA firewall.
Configure the basic IP addressing for the CISCO ASA interfaces.

Lab - 1 : Auto NAT and Manual NAT
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a) Connect the rollover console cable to the ASA con ole port (i.e. USB to Serial)
b) Check the "Computer management" in your PC and then check "device manager" (PORT
COM&LPT) and for the available serial port (i.e. COM 7" or other)
c) Using PUITY (Double click) in your desktop, click on serial and change the appropriate
COM port in step a) , use 9600 bits/sec as default connection speed) , then click "open"
d) Press enter and program the ASA as follows
Ciscoasa>enable (NO password , just press enter)
Ciscoasa#config t
Ciscoasa(config)#int gigO/ 1
Ciscoasa(config-if)#no shutdown
Ciscoasa(config-if)#nameif inside
Ciscoasa(config-rl)#security-level 100
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 10. 1 . 1 . 1 255.255.255.0
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ex it
Ciscoasa(config)#int gigO/O
Ciscoasa(config-if)#no shutdown
Ciscoasa(config-if)#nameif outside
Ciscoasa(config-if)#security-level 0
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 209 . 1 65.200.l 255.255.255 224
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Ciscoasa(config-it)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#int gig0/2
Ciscoasa(config-if)#no shutdown
Ciscoasa(config-if)#nameif dmz
Ciscoasa(config-if)#security-level 50
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 192. 1 68. 1 . l 255.255.255.0
e) By default the echo-reply ICMP is not allowed from a lower security to a higher security,
enabling lCMP inspection in the policy-map global_policy:
Ciscoasa(config)# policy-map global_policy
Ciscoasa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)# inspect icmp

f) Auto-NAT Configuration: The following procedure is one of the way to program NAT
and is configure under object network
Task l : The DMZ server requires a static translation when routed to the outside interface. The
translated ip address is 209 . 165.200.22:
Ciscoasa(config)# object network DMZ-SRY
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# host 192. 1 68. 1 . 10
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# nat (dmz, outside) static 209.165.200.22
g) Access the public server from the DMZ computer/server ( 192.168.1.10) by typing
http:/1209.1 65.200.30 (Ask the GA to start the Web-server service on the public
webserver 1209 . 1 65.200.30] and on the DMZ webserver ( 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 . 10)
h) check the translation after activity g) by typing (config) # show xlate

From the Dl\1Z Server connect to the Public Ser\'er:
o e a

OUTS I D E web Server
WELCOME!
Task2: The in ide network requires PAT when routed to the outside interface, the ho ts in the
inside network share the same public IP address 209.165.200.20:
Ciscoasa(config)# object network INSIDE-NETWORK
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# subnet l 0. 1 . 1 .0 255.255.255.0
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# nat (inside, outside) dynamic 209. 165.200.20
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i) Testing the translations: The show xlate command shown that the inside host with
10. 1 . 1 .2 is translated to 209 . 165.200.20

ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMMING.
Manually programming N ATIPAT, is recommended when you have to include a policy at which
at which it should translate when it's going to a particular destination.
To Begin; Clear previous configuration
Ciscoasa(config)# clear configure object
Manual Configuration
For The DMZ server, configure a translation that should be used only when the destination is the
outside network is 209 . 1 65.200.0/27 using the translated Ip addres 209. 1 65.200.25:
Cicoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SRV
Ciscoasa(config)# host 192. 168. 1 . 1 0
Ciscoasa(config)#ex it
Ciscoasa(config)# object network OUTSIDE-NETWORK
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# subnet 209. 165.200.0 255.255.25.224
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-MANUAL-NAT
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#host 209. 165.200.25
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (dmz,outside) source static DMZ-SRV DMZ-MANUAL-NAT destination
static OUTSIDE-NETWORK OUTSIDE-NETWORK
Do show xlate

Task3: For inside clients, configure a translation that should be used when accessing the DMZ
server on TCP port 8080, the inside hosts should use a single IP address 192.168. 1 . 1 1 and the
dmz server should see the port 80 instead of 8080:
Ciscoasa( config)#object network INSIDE-NETWORK
Ciscoasa(config)#subnet 10. 1 . 1 .0 255.255.255.0
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Ciscoasa(config)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ_PAT
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#host 192.168. 1 . 1 1
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object service HTTP_80
Ciscoasa(config-service-object)#service tcp destination eq www
Ciscoasa(config-service-object)#ex it
Ciscoasa(config)#object service HTTP_PROXY_PORT
Ciscoa a(config-service-object)#service tcp destination eq 8080
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (inside,DMZ) source dynamic INSIDE-NETWORK DMZ_PAT
destination tatic DMZ-SRV DMZ-SRV service HTTP_PROXY _PORT HTTP_80
From inside host, we can access the web server in dmz usin htt :// 1 92 . 1 68. 1 . 10:8080

Jco m e to XA M P P for Wind
ows 7.
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LAB 2: HTIP INSPECTION
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab i lo learn the default behavior of how an ASA firewall
inspect http traffic and to configure it.
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Task l : By default ASA does not allow a traffic to traverse from a lower security level to a
higher security level. We should configure an access list OUT-TO-DMZ that permits HTTP
traffic from the outside server to the internal IP address of the DMZ server. Apply the access list
to the ASA outside interface in the "IN" direction.
Solution:
Ciscoasa>enable
Ciscoasa#conf t
To Begin with, clear all previous configurations
Ci coasa(config)#clear configure nat
Ciscoasa(config)#clear configure object
Then Start Configuration
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SERVER-PRIV
Ciscoasa(config)#host 192.168. 1 . l 0
Ciscoasa(config)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#access-list OUT-TO-DMZ extended permit tcp host 209.165.200.30 object
DMZ-SERVER-PRIV eq www
Ciscoasa(config)#access-group OUT-TO-DMZ in interface outside
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Now, the DMZ
server can be accessed from the outside server.
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Another method that can be used to allow http traffic from lower security level to higher
security is when the traffic initially originated from a higher security level, the return traffic of
such traffic will be allow in from a lower security level to a higher security level.
Task 2: Without using access-list, configure the ASA to allow inbound return traffic of http from
a lower security level to a higher security level. In other words we will inspect if the traffic has
been originated in the inside or not and then allow it if originated from the inside.
Solution
We are going to make use of modular policy framework (MPF) and by default the ASA does not
inspect http traffic so we need to enable it.
Modular Policy Framework (MPF) configuration defines set of rules for applying fuewall
features. such as traffic inspecLion, QoS etc. to the traffic Lransiting the firewall.
Ciscoasa>enable
Ciscoasa#config t
Ciscoasa(config)#pol icy-map global_pol icy
Ciscoasa(config-pmap)#class inspection_default
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)#inspect http
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)#exit
Ciscoasa(coiifig-pmap)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#
What we have done is to inspect all http traffic that originate from inside, this will create a
session table and all return traffic of that traffic will allow in from lower security level to a
higher security level.
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Task 3: We are also going to use http inspection to drop all bad http traffic from coming into the
network. Bad traffic in this case are traffic that uses http port number other than the web traffic,
for example telnet traffic trying to use port 80 instead of port 23.
Configure HTTP inspection between any host from outside and the dmz server to verify
conformance to the http protocol.
Solution:
Create a NAT to allow the DMZ server to be accessed from the outside network
Create an http inspection policy-map named HTTP-Policy
Enable the HTTP protocol verification to drop and log all HTTP sessions that do not
conform to the standard protocol specifications.
Ciscoasa>enablc
Ciscoasa#config t
To start with, clear all previous object configuration and nat configuration.
Ciscoasa(config)#clear configure object
Ciscoasa(config)#clear configure nat
Now start the configuration
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SRV l
Ciscoasa(config)#host 192.168. 1 . 10
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (dmz,outside) static 209. 1 65.200.22
Ciscoasa(config)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#policy-map type inspect http HTTP-POLICY
Ciscoasa(config-pmap)#parameters
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-p)#protocol-violation action drop-connection log
Now, create a new traffic class inside the global-policy with the following parameters
Traffic class name: WEB-PROTECTION
Traffic Matching: From the ANY to the DMZ Server
Apply the configured HTTP-Policy HTTP inspection policy-map
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SERVER-PRIV
Ciscoasa(cisco)#host 192.168. 1 . 1 0
Ciscoasa(config)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#access-list GLOBAL-DMZ extended permit tcp any object DMZ-SERVER
PRIV eq www
Ciscoasa(config)#class-map WEB-PROTECTION
Ciscoasa(config)#rnatch access-list GLOBAL-DMZ
Ciscoasa(config)#pol icy-map global_policy
Ciscoasa(config-pmap)#class WEB-PROTECTION
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)#inspect http HTTP-POLICY
In order to check the policy type
ciscoasa# sh service-policy global
The following figure should be seen
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Testing and Verification
From the outside erver access the web page of the DMZ server through a web browser, we can
see below that the attempt is successful: Based on the NAT configuration, we can access the
DMZ server from outside network using 209 . 1 65.200.22 which will be translated to
192.168.1.10.

X A M P P Apache

+

MariaDB

+ p

Welcome to XA
MPP for Window
s 7.2 3

Now open putty in the outside server and access the DMZ server 209. 165.200.22 with telnet
using a port 80: This will be dropped becau e it's a bad http traffic, we are trying to to telnet
using http protocol port 110:80
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LAB : ACCESS-LIST ACL USING NETWORK OBJECT
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab is to learn how to use network object to group access-list
entries for easy configuration for traffic filtering.

11172.16.1.2
1
7
2
.
1
6
.
3
.
4
-"1w
lill
11 172.165.6 /:-0UTSIDE

<

�J

·--·,
---

10.3.0.011 6

lNSIOE

�TTP ONS ICMP

_____,

_

Notes:
A set of interface access rules can cause the Cisco ASA to permit or deny a designated host to
access another particular host with a specific network application (service). When there is only
one client, one host and one service, you need only a minimum number of lines in an interface
rule set. However, as the number of clients, servers, and services increases, the number of rules
that you need for each individual access type can increase and become unmanageable.
A better approach is to introduce object grouping. This solution allows you to arbitrarily group
hosts, resources, or services that share the same policy, which optimizes the access rules.
In our scenario above, the ASA control traffic between an internal enterprise network that is
connected over the inside interface and an external network that is connected over the outside
interface.
The internal subnet 10.3.0.0/16 and the internal client 10. 1 . 1 .2 should both have permanent
HTTP, FfP, DNS and ICMP access to a group of external servers ( 172. 1 6. 1 .2, 172. 16.3.4 and
172 . 1 6.5.6)
Task 1 : Create a network object for the network 10.3.0.0/16 and the host 10. 1 . 1 .2:
Solution
Ciscoasa>enable
Ciscoasa#config t
Ciscoasa(config)#object network NETWORK-CLIENT
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#subnet 10.3.0.0 255.255.255.0
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Ciscoasa(config-obj-network )#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network PC-CLIENT
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#host 10. 1 . 1 .2
Task 2: Create a network object for the external servers:
Ciscoasa(config-obj-net work)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network SERVERS-A
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#host 172 . 1 6. 1 .2
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network SERVERS-B
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#host 172.16.3 .4
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#exit
Ciscoasa(config)#object network SERVERS-C
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#host 172.16.5.6
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#exit
Task 3 : Creates a network object group for the clients (Grouping the clients)
Ciscoasa(config)#object-group network INTERNAL
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object NETWORK-CLIENT
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object PC-CLIENT
Task 4: Create a network object group for the servers:
Ciscoasa(config)#object-group network EXTERNAL-SERVERS
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object SERVERS-A
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object SERVERS-B
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object SER VERS-C
Task 5: Creates a service object group:
Ciscoasa(config)#object-group service CLIENT-SERVICES
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object icmp echo
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object tcp destination eq ftp
Ciscoasa(config)#servicc-object tcp destination eq http
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object udp destination eq domain
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object tcp destination eq domain
Task 6: Configure an ACL that uses network and service object groups:
Ciscoasa(config)#access-list INSIDE-ACL extended permit object-group CLIENT-SERVICES
object-group INTERNAL Object-group EXTERNAL-SERVERS
Task 7: Apply the ACL inbound of the inside interface:
Ciscoasa(config)#int gigO/l
Ciscoasa(config-if)#access-group INSIDE-ACL in interface inside
Task 8: Test the policy by typing Ciscoa a(config) #sh run object-group
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ciscoasaf. show run object-group
object-group network INTERNAL
network-object object NETWORK-CLIENT
network-object object PC-CLIENT
o b j e c t -group

network

EXTERNAL - S E RVERS

n e t wo r k - o b j e c t

object

network-obj e c t

ob j e ct

SERVER-A

SERVER-B

network-object ob j ect SERVER-C
object-group service CLIENT-SERVICES
service-object icmp echo
service-object tcp destination eq ftp
service-object tcp destination eq www
service-object udp destination eq domain
ciscoasa#
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PALO ALTO FIREWALL LAB PRACTICES
LAB 1 : PALO ALTO INITIAL WEB ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
In this lab you will:
•
•

Connect to the firewall through the MGT interface
Create new administrator roles and accounts on the firewall

·. .

-

.

n palo ,g

'\

�----------�

-

MGT

1 92.168.1.1
1 92.168. 1 . 1 00/24
Task 1 : The Palo Alto firewall is recently acquired firewall, the management interface typically
comes with a default IP address 192.168. 1 . 1/24. Configure your computer in the IP address range
of the MGT port of the device to have access to the web interface with a default
usemame/password of admin/admin.
Solution
Configure the physical Ethernet interface of your laptop with an IP address on
the same subnet as the MGf port of your firewall. (i.e. TCP/IP settings of the
NIC card)
If your firewall is at default configuration, the IP address of the MGT port is
192.168.1 . 1 124. Give your laptop Ethernet port an address of 192. 168.1. 100/24.
If your firewall is not at default configuration, give your laptop an IP address on the same
subnet as the MGT port IP address.
Connect an Ethernet cable between your laptop Ethernet port and the MGT port
of your firewall.
Open a command prompt on your laptop and verify you can ping the MGT port
IP address.
Disable any other active interfaces on your laptop, including the wireless interface, so the
Ethernet port connected to the firewall is your only active port.
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Access the management fP address of the firewall on a web browser
https:// 1 92 . 1 68. 1 . l (or the default IP address assigned to the Firewall)
Type in the username/password as admin/admin. A warning about the default admin
credentials appears.
Click OK to dismiss the warning for now. The PAN firewall GUI appears.
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Task 2: Change the password of the admin account to EIULAB to disable the warnings about using
default credentials.
Solution
On the WEB UI of the firewall, Click Device> Administrators
Click admin in the list of users. Change the password from admin to EIU LAB. Click OK
to close the configuration window. (leave the SSH PKA uncheck)

DI
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Task 3 : Create a role for a n assi tant administrator which will allow access to all firewall
functionality through the WEBUI except Monitor, Network, Privacy, and Device. Create an
account using this role.
Solution
Click Device> Admin Roles.(in the left pane)
Click Add in the lower left of the panel and create a new admin role:
Type Policy Admins in the name window
Web UI tab categories

Click the following major categories to disable them:
•
Monitor
•
Network
•
Device
•
Privacy
The remaining major categories should remain enabled.

Click OK to continue.
Task 4: Create a general account
Click Device> Administrators.
CJ ick Add in the lower left comer of the panel. Configure a new administrator account:
Name field
Password/Confinn Password
Role
Profile
SSH

Type ip-admin
Type paloalto
Select Role Based
Select Policy Admin (scroll down menu)
Leave it uncheck

Click OK
To save your configuration, click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click
OK to the commit pop- up window and wait until the commit process completes, then click
Close.
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LAB 2: Layer 3 Configuration
In this lab you will:

•

Create Interface Management Profiles

•

Configure Ethernet interfaces with Layer 3 information

•

Configure DHCP
virtual router

e1/3

�[II]

Task 1 : Create new Security Zones
Create two zones, Untiust-L3 and Trust-L3, interface e l /3 should be assigned to the Untrust-L3
zone, while interface e l /4 should be assigned to the Tiust-L3 zone.
1.

Go to the WEBUI and click the Network tab > Zones (in the left pane)

2.

Click Add and create the Untrust-L3 zone:
Name
type Untrust-L3
Type

Verify that Layer 3 is selected

Click OK lo close the zone creation window.
3. Click Add and create the Trust-L3 zone:
Name
type Tiust-L3
Type

Verify that Layer 3 is selected

Click OK to close the zone creation window.
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Task 2: Create Interface Management Profiles
Configure the interface in Untrust-L3 to be able to respond to pings and the interface in Trust-L3 to
be able to provide al I management services.
The Interface in the Untrust zone should be a DHCP client, while interface in the Trust zone
should have a static IP address 192.168.2.1/24
Solution
4.

Click Network > Network Profiles > Interface Mgmt

5.

Click Add and create an interface management profile as follows:
Name column

Type allow_all

Permitted Services
Permitted IP Addresses

Check all boxes
Do not add anyaddresses

Click OK to close the Interface Management Profile
6.

Click Add and create another interface management profile:

Zon1
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Interface T)l:e

Select from draw dowrmenu Layer 3

Config tab
Virtual Router

Keep default (none)

Security Zone

Select Untrust-L3

DHCP Client

Select DHCP Client

[Pv4 tab

Advanced

tab > Other Info tab

Management Profile

Select allow_ping

Name column

type allow_ping

Permitted Services

check only the Ping check box

Permitted IP Addresses

Do not add any addresses

Click OK to close the interface management profile creation window.
7. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait
until the commit process completes before continuing.

Task 3 : Configure Ethernet interfaces with Layer 3 info
8. Click the Network tab > Interfaces > Ethernet tab
9.

Click the interface name ethernetl/3. Configure the interface:

Note: Do check any other box if not instructed to do so

Click OK to close the interface configuration window.
10. Click the interface name ethemet 1/4. Configure the interface:
Interface Type
Config tab

Select Layer 3

Virtual Router
Security Zone
1Pv4 tab

Keep default(none)

Tvoe
IP

Select Trust-L3
Keep default(Static)
Click Add then type 192. 168.2.1124
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Advanced > Other Info
Management Profile

Select allow_all

Click OK to close the intetface configuration window.
You should see both intetfaces on green as shown in the next figure, if the
interfaces are not
Green call your instructor
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Task 4: Configure DHCP
The Trust-L3 zone will be where the internal clients connect to the firewall and so the interface
in Trust-L3 will provide DHCP addresses to these internal clients. The DHCP server you

configure in the Trust-L3 zone will inherit DNS settings from the external facing intetface.
Solution
1 1 . Click the Network tab > DHCP > DHCP Server.
1 2 . Click Add to define a new DHCP Server:
Interface Name

Select ethernet l/4

Inheritance Source

Select ethernetl/3

Gateway

Enter 192.168.2.1

Primary DNS

Select inherited

IP Pools

Click Add then enter 192. 168.2.50- L 92. 168.2.60

Click OK to close the DHCP Server configuration window.

Testing the DHCP Server configuration
1 3 . Connect a laptop to e l /4 and make sure the laptop NIC setting is set to DHCP.
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Please note, your laptop will not get an IP address until you complete Laboratory
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LAB 3 : Virtual Router and NAT Configuration
In this lab you will:

•

Create a Virtual Router

•

Create Source NAT policy

•

Create a pair of simple Security Policies
virtual router

..

e1/3� �
..

Task 1 : Create a Virtual Router
Configure a virtual router on the firewall so that the internal and external interfaces on the firewall
must route traffic through the external-facing interface by default
Solution
1 . Click the Network tab > Virtual Routers (in the left pane)
2. Click Add to define a new virtual router:

I

General tab
. _
1_
_
_
_

I

-

Name

-1 type Student-YR
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Interfaces pane

Click Add then select ethemet l/3

Click Add again and select ethernet l/4

Remember: Do not select or type in boxes you have nol inslructed Lo do so

Click OK to close the virtuaJ router configuration window.
3. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait
until the commit process completes before continuing.
Task 2:

Create a Source NAT policy

Configure a NAT policy so that all traffic originating in the Trust-L3 zone appears to
come from the external-facing address of the firewall.
Solution
4. Click the Policies tab > NAT (on the left pane)
5. Click Add to define a new source NAT policy:
General tab
Name

Type Student_Source_NAT

Original Packet tab
Source Zone pane

Click Add and select Trust-L3

Destination Zone

Select Untrust-L3

Destination Interface

Select ethemetl/3

Translated Packet > Source
Address Translation tab
Translation Type

Select Dynamic IP and Port

Address Type

Select Interface Address

Interface

Select ethemet l /3

Click OK to close the NAT policy configuration window.
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6. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait
until the commit process completes before continuing.
You will still not be able to access the Internet from your PC. The final task will
be to create the Security Policies to allow traffic to flow from the Trust-L3 to
the Untrust-L3 zone
Task 3: Create Security Policie

7. Click the Policies Tab > Security (left pane)
8. Delete any configure rule (Highlight the policy (i.e. click) and then click
"delete"

9. Click Add to define a new security policy
Give it a Name: Internet-Security-Rule
Source > Click Add > Trust-L3
Destination > Click Add > Untrust-L3
Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEB U L Click OK again and wait until the
commit process completes before continuing.
Task 5: Check that you are able to connect to the internet from your computer or the
LAPTOP connect to the Palo AJto firewall

,_
__
, ,
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LAB 4: APP-ID
In this lab you will:
•

Create a security policy to allow basic intemet connectivity and log dropped traffic

•

Enable Application Block pages

•

Create Application Filters and Application Groups

Task 1 : Create the Allow All Out Policy
At this point, the firewall is configured with the basics (i.e. IP addresses in interfaces) but. is
not able to pass traffic. Security policies must be defined before traffic will flow between

zones. Configure a Policy to allow all outbound traffic, and to block and log any incoming traffic.

This will allow employees to surf the Internet, and will allow the firewall to log which applications
they have used.
Solution

1.
2.

Go to the WebUI and click Policies > Security (Top of left pane)
Delete any existing security policy.(click on the policy and then click delete at the

bottom)
3.

Click Add to define a security policy:
General tab
Name

Type Allow_All_Out

Source tab
-
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S ource Zone

Click Add a nd select Trust -L3

S ource Address

Select A ny

Des tina tion tab
Des tination Zone

Click Add a nd select Untru st-L3

Desti nati on Address

Select A ny

�

A pplication tab
Applications

Select A ny

Service/URL Category tab
Service

Selec t A ny fr om the pull-dow n

Actions tab
Action Setting

Selec t Allow

Log Setting

Selec t Log at Se ssi onE nd

-

-

4. C lick OK t o cl ose the security policy c onfi gura tion window.
Create a Deny a nd Log I nb ou nd Policy
5. Click Add to defi ne the Deny Inbou nd securit ypolicy:
Ge neral tab
Name

Tvoe De ny and LogI nbound

S ource tab
S ource Zone
S ource Addre ss
Destination tab
Destination Zone

Click Add and selec t Untrust-L3
Select A ny
Click Add a nd select T rust -L3

Destination Address
Applica tion tab

Select A ny

Appli cations
Service/URL Category tab

Check the A nyb ox

Service
Acti ons tab

Selec t A nyfrom the pull-down

Action Setting
LogSett ing

Selec t Deny
Selec t Logat Se ssi on End

6. Click OK to cl ose the security p olicy c onfi guration wind ow.

-
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7.

Make sure that the Allow All Out is above the Deny and Log Inbound policy in the list of

Security
Policies.
If the Allow All out policy is not above the Deny and Log Inbound policy
Click to Highlight the policy, then click from the drop down menu, select Move and
from there be sure to move the policy above or below

8. Before testing be sure the configuration looks like the following figure
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Test the configuration

8. Test internet connectivity by browsing websites from your laptop. You should be able to
surf the Web on

9.

http and https sites.

Connect to the

sitefacebookcom

10. Connect to the site box.net

11. Go to Monitor> Logs > Traffic to see a record of your Internet browsing. Especially
notice the Application column.

95
Task 2: Create an Application Group
Create a General Internet policy to restrict users to a set of commonly used applications (dns,
fileserve, flash, ftp, paloalto-updates, ping, web-browsing, ssl). The applications should only be
permitted on application default ports. All other traffic (inbound and outbound) should be blocked
and logged. Configure the firewall to notify users when blocked applications are used so that the
help desk does not get called for "connection issues" that arc actually blocked applications.
Solution
1.

Click Objects > Application Groups.(on the left pane)

2.

erICk Add to de rme the Known-G00d appr1cat1on group:

Name

Type Known-Good

Applications

Cl ick Add and select each of the following:
•

dns

•

fileserve

•

flash

•

ftp

•

paloalto-updates

Click OK to close the application group configuration window.
In order to Disable the Allow All Out Policy go to Policies > Security
3.

Select the Allow All Out Policy and click Disable.

Create the General Internet Policy

4.

Go to the WEBUI and click Policies > Security.

5. Click Add to define a security policy:
General tab
Name

Type

General Internet

Source tab
Source Zone

Click Add and elect Trust-L3

Source Address

Select Any

Destination tab
Destination Zone

Click Add and select Untrnst-L3

-
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Destination Address
Appl ication tab
Applications

Select Anv
Click Add and select the Known-Good Application

Service/URL Category tab
Select annlication-default from the oull-down

Service
Actions tab
Action Settine
Log Setting

-

Select Allow
Select Lo!! at Session End

Click OK to close the security policy configuration window.
Create Policies to Deny and Log All Outbound Traffic

6. Click Policies > Security.
.
o icy:
7. Cl IC
k Add to defime the Denyand Log 0utboundsecurityp
General tab
Name
Source tab

1

Type

Denv and LogOutbound

Source Zone

Click Add and select Trust-L3

Source Address

Select Any

Destination tab
Destination Zone

Click Add and select Untrust-L3

Destination Address

Select Any

Application tab
Applications

Check the Anybox

Service/URL Category tab
Service

Select any from thepull-down

Actions tab
Action Setting

Select Deny

Log Setting

Select Log at Session End

Click OK to close the security policy configuration window.

8.

Rearrange the Security Policies in the following order:
Click to Highlight the policy, then click from the drop down menu. select Move and
from there be sure to move the policy above or below
a.

General Internet

-

97
b.

Deny and

Log
Outbound c.
Deny and
Log Inbound

Make sure any other Security Policies are disabled.

9. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait until
the commit process completes before continuing.
Verify Internet Connectivity and Application Blocking

10. Test internet connectivity by browsing websites from your laptop. Does web surfing over
ports 80 and

443 work? You may notice some difficulty reaching sites that you were able to
reach before you implemented a stricter Security Policy.

1 1 . Attempt to browse to Facebook. The browser should not be able to display the site.
12. Use a browser to connect to the site http://www.box.net. The browser should not be able
to get to the display site.

1 3 . Go to Monitor > Logs > Traffic to review the traffic logs to determine why this site is not
reachable.
You can see that the boxnet-base andfacebook-base applications are not allowed by the
configured policies.

14. Attempt to reach the site http://www.box. net using the proxy site
http://www.avoidr. com. The site fails to load.

15. Check the traffic logs again and you will find that the application phproxy has been
blocked. This is why the avoidr site failed.
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Enable the Application Block Page

16. Retum to the WEBU1 and click Device > Response Pages.
1 7 . Find the Application Block Page hne and click Disabled.
18. Check the Enable Application Block Page box, and then click OK.
19. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait
until the commit process completes before continuing.

20. Open a browser window and go to http://wwwjacebook.com. This time you see an
Application Block Page explaining why the site was blocked.

99
LAB 5: APP-ID LAB I I
In this lab you will: (this will enhance and continue the work o f Lab 4)
•

Create a security policy to allow basic internet connectivity and log dropped traffic

•

Create Application Filters and Application Groups

Trust-L3

Task I : The results from Lab 4 tasks testing, resulted in the following discoverie :
The logs from task

1 show heavy use of a variety of internet proxies and web-based file

sharing services by users. Create a Deny list explicitly preventing the use of these

applications.
The rules blocking all unmatched traffic were too restrictive for your environment. The testing,
denied access to numerous vital applications, causing a surge in support calls. Any traffic which
does not match the Deny list should be allowed

but logged for future policy decision.

The following table shows a summary of the task we will accomplish in this lab
Application Filter names

Proxies
Web-Based-File-Sharing
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Security Policy names

Block-Known-Bad
Allow and Log Outbound

Setting for Proxies application filter

Subcategory: Proxies

Settings for Web-Based-FileSharing application filter

Subcategory: file-sharing

Members of the Known-Bad
application group

Technology: browser-based
Proxies
Web-BasedFile- Sharing

Solution:
Disable previous Security Policies
1.

2.

Click the Deny and Log Outbound rule and click the Disable button
Click the General Internet rule and click Disable button.
Create Application Filters and Groups

3. Go to the WEBUI and click Objects > Application Filters.
4. Click Add to define the Proxies a
Name
Subcate o

lication filter:

column

Click OK to close the application filter
configuration window.
5. Click Add to define the Web-Based-File-Shru.ing
a lication filter:
Name
T e Web-Based-File-Sharin
Select file-sharin
Select browser-based
Click OK to close the application filter configuration window.
6. Click Objects > Application Groups

.

.
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7. Click Add to define the Known-Badapplication group

Name : Type

Known-Bad

Applications: Click Add and select f r o m t h e d r o p d o w n m e n u each of the
following:
•

Proxies

•

Web-Based-File-Sharing

Click OK to close the application group configuration window.
Update Securi�y Policies

8. Click Policies > Security.
9.

e

erlCk Add to defime th Block- Known-Bad secuntvpor1cv:
General tab
Name

tab

Source
Source Zone
Source Address
Destination tab

Destini:itinnZone

Destination Address

Tvne Block-Known-Bad
rljr'k Arlrl and <u�IP.('� Tni�t-1.1
Select Anv

Click Add and select Untrust -L3
Select Anv

Aoolication tab
Annl ications
Service/URL Cate2orv tab

Click Add and select Known-Bad

Service
Actions tab

Select anv from the null-down

Action Settin2

Select Denv

Lo2 Settine:

Select Loe. at Session End

Click OK to close the security policy configuration window.

10. Add the Allow and Log Outbound Security Policy with the following values

General tab
Name
Source tab
Source Zone

Type Allow and Log Outbound
Click Add and select Trust-L3
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Source Address

Select Any

Destination tab
Destination Zone

Click Add and select Untrust-L3

Destination Address

Select Any

Application tab
Check the Any box

Applications
Service/URL Category tab

Select any from the pull-down

Service
Actions tab
Action Setting

Select Allow

Log Setting

Select Log at Session End

Cl ick OK to close the security policy configuration window.

1 1 . Use the Move buttons at the bottom of the page to arrange the policies in a logical
order. You can also rearrange the rule by clicking and dragging them into the correct
order. Confirm that your security list looks like this (order)
•

Block-Known-Bad

•

Allow-and-Log-AU-Out

•

Deny-and-Log-Inbound

Make sure any other policies are disabled

12. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK agai n and wait until the
commit process completes before continuing.
Verify Internet Connectivity and Application Blocking

1 3 . Confirm that you can surf the Internet, except for being blocked from web-based filesharing sites like avoidr.com
14. Confirm that you cannot reach file-sharing sites using avoidr.com
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15. Click the ACC tab to access the Application Command Center. Use the drop-down
menu in the application section of the ACC to select different ways of viewing the
traffic that you have generated.

16. Click on one of the Applications to get more information. A detailed view appears.
17. Click the x in the box in the upper right hand corner to close the detailed view.

